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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - CITIZENSHIP - DRAFT-AVOIDANCE STATUTE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL- In 1951 plaintiff, a native-bom American
citizen, went to England for temporary work, as a physician and research
physiologist. In 1953 his draft board ordered him to report for induction
but he failed to comply with the order. The State Department then issued
an administrative order expatriating plaintiff for remaining outside the
United States for the purpose of avoiding service in the armed forces in
violation of section 349 (a) (10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952.1 In a declaratory judgment suit before a three-judge court, held,
section 349 (a) (10) is unconstitutional. Expatriation of United States
citizens for draft avoidance is a cruel and unusual punishment which
violates the eighth amendment.2 Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C.
1960), jurisdictional question postponed, 365 U.S. 808 (1961).
In 1868S Congress declared it to be the inherent right of any person to

1" (a) • • • a pei:son who is a national of the United States whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: ••• (10) departing from or remaining outside
of the jurisdiction of the United States in time of war or during a period declared by the
President to be a period of national emergency for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States. For the purposes
of this paragraph failure to comply with any provision of any compulsory service laws of
the United States shall raise the presumption that the departure from or absence from the
United States was for the purpose of evading or avoiding training and service in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States." 66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952), 8 U.S.C, §
1481 (a) (10) (1958).
2 The court felt itself bound to follow Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), which
declared the statutory provision [66 Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1958)]
expatriating citizens for desertion in time of war unconstitutional because expatriation was
a cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment.
3 Prior to 1868 American courts generally followed the English rule that a citizen
could not voluntarily expatriate himself. Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (ll Pet.) 242 (18!10).
The executive department, however, generally held otherwise and recognized a right of
voluntary expatriation in the individual. 8 Moou, DIGEST OF !Nn:RNATIONAL I.Aw § 4!14,
at 562 (1906). See also Justice lredell's opinion in Talbot v. Jansen, 8 U.S. (ll Dall.) l!lll,
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separate his allegiance from one nation and transfer it to another,4 and in
1915 the power of Congress to enact legislation depriving individuals of
their American citizenship was upheld by the Supreme Court in Mackenzie
v. Hare.r, The Nationality Act of 19406 codified the expatriation statutes
scattered throughout the statute books. The federal courts, in applying
expatriating legislation, have consistently held that acts which result in loss
of nationality must be voluntarily performed7 with an intent to do the act
which constitutes expatriation.8 Once this intent is found the citizen is
bound by the legal consequences of his act. That he did not intend to
effect expatriation by these acts or did not know that expatriation would
follow is irrelevant.9 This position was recently reaffirmed by Perez v.
Brownell1° in which the Supreme Court held that Congress has the power
to divest citizenship if a "rational nexus" exists between the exercise of a
specific congressional power and divestiture of citizenship, provided the
action of Congress is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The
Court concluded that Congress' power in the area of foreign affairs authorized it to control the voting of American citizens in foreign elections
and that expatriation was a proper method by which to exercise this power.
Such voting was thought to be potentially embarrassing to the American
Government and to increase the possibility of embroiling this country in
disputes with other nations. In a vigorous dissent Mr. Chief Justice Warren
stated that Congress has power only to declare acts to be expatriating which
clearly show lack of allegiance to the United States. The Chief Justice
reiterated this view in his majority opinion in Trop v. Dulles.11
160-65 (1795). For a discussion of the early history of denationalization, see generally
Flournoy, Dual Nationality and Election (pts. I &: 2), 30 YALE L.J. 545, 693 (1921); Flournoy, Naturalization and Expatriation (pts. I &: 2), 31 YALE L.J. 702, 848 (1922); Nielsen,
Some Vexatious Questions Relating to Nationality, 20 CoLUM. L. REv. 840 (1920).

REv. STAT. § 1999 (1875); 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1958).
239 U.S. 299 (1915).
o 54 Stat. II37 (1940).
7 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 499-501 (1950); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S.
325, 334 (1939); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915); Perri v. Dulles, 206 F.2d 586,
590-91 (3d Cir. 1953); Acheson v. Wohlmuth, 196 F.2d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
8 Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299
(1915).
9 For discussion of the requisite state of mind see Hepburn, Expatriation Through
Inadvertance, 3 ALA. L. REv. I (1950); Comment, 49 MICH. L. REv. 595, 603 (1951). One
mitigating element has been the willingness of the courts to find duress in the citizen's
performance of the act on the barest evidence when in fact there is no allegiance shown
to a foreign nation. See generally, Roche, The Loss of American Nationality- The Development of Statutory Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 25 (1950); Comment, 54 CoLUM. L.
REv. 932 (1954).
10 356 U.S. 44 (1958). This case deals with a dual national of the United States and
Mexico who was born in Texas, but resided in Mexico after age IO. He sought to return
to the United States but was refused admission on the ground that he had lost his citizenship by voting in a Me.xican political election. The Supreme Court upheld this administrative ruling. See Comments, 56 MICH. L. REV. II42 (1958); 107 U. PA. L. REv. 118
(1958).
11356 U.S. 86 (1958). See note 2 supra.
4
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962

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[ Vol. 59

The Trop case held unconstitutional section 349 (a) (8) of the Im.migration and Nationality Act of 195212 which expatriates any citizen convicted by a court martial of desertion and given a dishonorable discharge.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren realized that a majority of the Court favored the
Perez rule. Thus, although he thought the case ought to be decided accord•
ing to the views he promulgated in his Perez dissent, he held that even if
citizenship may be divested in the exercise of some governmental power,
the statute in question specified a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. The cases clearly indicate a split on the
Supreme Court with regard to the basic philosophy of expatriation legislation. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas apparently
view the question from the standpoint of individual liberties and adhere
to the rule that there is no congressional power to declare that acts will
result in expatriation unless such acts clearly manifest the actor's lack of
allegiance to the United States.13 Moreover, these three Justices regard
expatriation legislation as punishment and thus will always inquire whether
it violates the eighth amendment.14 Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan,
and Brennan are inclined toward a power approach and adhere to the
rational nexus rule of the Perez case,1 5 but feel that such legislation does
not prescribe "punishment."16 The position of Mr. Justice Whittaker is
more difficult to determine. Apparently he follows the general approach
of the majority in Perez, but would require that the proscribed acts have a
substantial effect in an area in which Congress has power to legislate.17
Mr. Justice Stewart has not had the opportunity to express his views on this
question.
The principal case should be compared with Mendoza-Martinez v.
Mackey,1s apparently the only other case to examine extensively the constitutionality of section 349 (a) (10). There the district court first held that
section 349 (a) (10) was constitutional, but the Supreme Court vacated the
judgmentlo and directed the district court to rehear the case in the light of
Trop v. Dulles. The district court then held the act unconstitutional20
because there was no rational nexus between either the war powers or the
foreign affairs power and section 349 (a) (10); the court did not discuss the
Stat. 163, 267-68 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a) (8) (1958). See note 2 supra.
13 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 62 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
14Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96-99 (1958).
15 See Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). See also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
114 (1958) (dissenting 9pinion).
16 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 124 (1958).
17 Mr. Justice Whittaker's beliefs are expressed in his memorandum opinion in Perez
v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 84-85 (1958).
18 Civil No. 1314-ND, S.D. Cal., Sept. 22, 1955, afj'd, 238 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1956),
judgment vacated and remanded, 356 U.S. 258 (1958). For authority upholding constitutionality of § 349 (a) (10) or its predecessor without extensive discussion, see Gonzales v.
Landon, 215 F.2d 955 (9th Cir. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 350 U.S. 920 (1955); Vidales
v. Brownell, 217 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1954).
10 356 U.S. 258 (1958).
20 Civil No. 1314-ND, S.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 1958, remanded, 362 U.S. 384 (1960).
12 66
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element of punishment. Unfortunately, the court in the principal case gave
virtually no reason for following the Trop decision although some language
indicates the court felt that section 349 (a) (10) violated the cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment. On the other
hand, the court might have believed that there was no rational nexus between draft-avoidance and expatriation-the view of the Mendoza-Martinez
court. The court did not even discuss certain other considerations relating
to the Trop case. Trop involved a military determination of desertion in
time of war. The deserting party was absent less than twenty-four hours
and returned voluntarily; at no time did he show any allegiance to the
enemy. In the principal case the plaintiff remained abroad after he learned
that he had been summoned for induction; his conduct evidenced a
greater lack of allegiance to the United States. Moreover, the court apparently accorded little significance to the fact that plaintiff's citizenship
had been divested by an administrative order instead of by a judicial
tribunal. In the Trop case, a military tribunal determined whether the
soldier had in fact deserted and thereby committed the necessary expatriating act under section 349 (a) (8). In his majority opinion in Trop Mr. Chief
Justice Warren commented on the undesirability of having military officials
decide the fate of a citizen's nationality, intimating that the military court
was an improper tribunal.2 1 More significantly, the Chief Justice stated
in dictum that "section 401 G) [now 349 (a) (10)] decrees loss of citizenship
without providing any semblance of procedural due process whereby the
guilt of the draft evader may be determined before the sanction is imposed.
•• .''22 Thus if one basis for the refusal to allow expatriation to be imposed
for desertion is the undesirability of a military adjudication of facts which
might affect one's citizenship, there is much greater reason to disallow a
a statutory provision such as 349 (a) (IO) which provides for a determination
of such facts without any hearing. Surely these considerations deserved
attention in the principal case.
The court in the principal case should not have felt constrained to
depend on the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment provision to invalidate the expatriation statute for draft-avoidance. Even if
the rule of the Perez case is to be applied, there does not seem to be the
same effect on American foreign policy by citizens leaving the country
merely to evade the draft as there does when American citizens vote in
politically significant foreign elections. The plaintiff's remaining in Europe
for the purpose of evading training and service in the armed forces is to be
condemned; such conduct, however, does not show a renunciation of his
citizenship or an allegiance to a foreign country. It is difficult to find any
rational relationship between the power of Congress to regulate foreign
affairs and section 349 (a) (10). Nor is there any compelling connection be21 Trop v. Dulles,
22 Id. at 93.94,

356 U.S. 86, 90 (1958).
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tween the congressional war powers and the expatriation of draft-dodgers
as a "necessary and proper" sanction.23 If expatriation of draft-avoiders
is to serve as a deterrent, it would seem that the more ordinary form of
criminal punishment would be a sufficient deterrent.
Moreover, even if the section in question is rationally related either to
the war power or foreign affairs power of Congress, the effect on the individual should not be overlooked. This underlies the present split on
the Supreme Court. The policy behind the point of view expressed by
Mr. Chief Justice Warren deserves close attention. Since the government
derives its powers from the consent of the governed, it can be argued that
it has no power to destroy the relationship which gives rise to its e.-..:istence.
Rather, the government only has power to give formal recognition to the
inevitable consequence of the citizen's mm voluntary surrender of his
citizenship. At present, there are at least four Justices who share this
point of view. Although the effects of the loss of citizenship are speculative
since Congress has not legislated specifically on the status of such denationalized persons, the loss of such citizenship does result in the loss of
certain economic and political rights such as the right to engage in some
professions and other types of employment, and the right to vote and hold
public office. Moreover, expatriation represents a loss of the right to have
rights-loss of membership in any organized community capable of guaranteeing any rights. The individual becomes a stateless person; any nation
can at will expel him or prevent his departure. Neither the governments
of individual states nor the international organizations are considered to
have legal standing to intervene in his behalf. He exists at the mercy of
the state in which he resides.24 These effects seem harsh enough to demand
a reassessment of the propriety of treating the individual right of citizenship as a mere means for effectuating congressional power manipulated
within the broad confines of the "necessary and proper" clause.

Ralph L. Wright

23 Mendoza-Martinez v. Mackey, Civil No. 1314-ND, S.D. Cal., Sept. 24, 1958, remanded,
362 U.S. 384 (1960).
24 See generally Comment, 64 YALE L.J. 1164, 1189-94 (1955).

